replenish their mental warehouses was unpardonable.

I urged Sir Edward Carson to utilise the services of those men in the Anti-Submarine Department of the Admiralty. He was fully in sympathy with the idea, and undertook to see that their services should be utilised.

At a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 30th June, 1917, I asked the First Sea Lord whether the Admiralty were making any progress *Jellicois in* ti^ organisation of an Offensive Section of the Operations Division. Admiral Jellicoe said that the First Lord had thought it would be a good plan to assemble some junior officers to form a section for investigating offensive operations. *He himself felt it was not much use putting junior officers there. He could not give the time to examine numbers of projects, and he himself had examined all the possibilities of offensive action.* Captain Richmond's name had been proposed for this section, but the First Lord told us that after seeing Captain Richmond he had rejected it. Another officer, selected by himself, was coming up to the Admiralty in his place. He felt, however, *that this section would very likely only waste his time,* though he hoped to be able to refer to them the working out in detail of his own projects.

It is also interesting to record Admiral Jellicoe's opinion as to the offensive value of an overwhelming fleet. I was dissatisfied that our Navy, with all its tremendous power, could do so little against the

Belgian harbours which were used as bases for the German submarine and torpedo flotillas, and I asked Jellicoe whether, if the German Fleet had the same preponderance over ours as we and the Americans together now enjoyed over theirs, they